In light of recent political developments in North America and around the world, one might expect to find at least some works addressing a present-day type of anti-colonialism in the current academic literature on decolonization. However, contrarily to what some activists with an academic background might expect, « anti-colonialism » seems mostly reserved to pieces addressing past movements of decolonization, typically those movements that took place in the Third World in the aftermath of the Second World War (and, in the case of Quebec, what relates to 19th century struggles against British Canadian supremacy). To most researchers, post-colonialism, decolonization and/or decoloniality seem more accurate to describe current protests against ongoing colonial orders. Without doubt, these distinctions accurately address theoretical technicalities embedded in a rich and diverse tradition of post-colonial studies, critical race theory and indigenous studies, among others. Yet, those scholarly distinctions sometimes hardly translate into the material world of social movements and activism, apart maybe amongst their elites. Without denying the legitimacy of post-colonial or decolonial endeavours, most movements envisioning decolonial possibilities are still primarily focused on confronting colonialism on a daily basis. From this perspective stems the author's conviction that anti-colonialism as a concept and as a political stance still retain most of its strength and accuracy in the present situation. This stance does not deny anti-colonialism (as a theoretical frame) may have some inconsistencies. Its – mostly – negative definition in relation to colonialism undoubtedly weighs on its capacity to envision empowerment in any other way than in relation – albeit in contradiction – to settler colonialism as a structure, and to settlers as a diverse political and social group defined in part by the explicit and implicit denial of its own group position.

Yet, the framing of current social movements opposing colonialism as 'anti-colonial' rather than 'post-colonial' or 'processes of decoloniality' may bear some descriptive usefulness with the potential to balance its performative issues. It is our understanding this framing might help activists and academics take into account the persistence of mechanisms of domination based on racial prejudice within those same movements. However, delving further into those issues requires first our definition of anti-colonialism be clarified.

Our object, Canadian anti-colonialism, is situated at the junction of three specific traditions: indigenous sovereignty (or nationhood), environmentalism, and global justice. While interconnected, these three traditions can create an anti-colonial frame only when they ground themselves in the acknowledgment of colonialism as a fundamental structure of North-American political orders, that is, when they assume the priority of indigenous sovereignty over matters of national politics and security. There have been previous attempts

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1 With notable exceptions, such as those mentioned in this article.
at theorizing a Canadian anti-colonialism. Taiaiake Alfred’s concept of anarcho-indigenism is one of them. While this concept has since been more or less abandoned by its creator, some authors have taken onto themselves the task of developing it further (Day 2008; Lagalisse 2011; Lewis 2015). There is no denying anarcho-indigenism as a kind of theory in action speaks to our definition of anti-colonialism, even more so considering its validity in the context of our current work. Our assumption is that anarcho-indigenism is one particular avatar of the general frame of contemporary anti-colonialism.

Canadian anti-colonialism – as a theory without an agreed-upon name – has been growing in the North-American activist and academic literature over the last two decades. Its physical embodiment in the realm of social movements, if existent, seems more precarious. This political uncertainty within movements that remain at best local and episodic, at worst parochial and ignored by the rest of society might explain both their attractiveness and elusiveness for participatory research and mainstream political theory, respectively. However, this paucity of both movements and analysis of said movement is in stark contrast with the growing alleged concerns of mainstream Canadian politics with environmental and indigenous issues since the beginning of the 1990s.

Moreover, it should be noted that from a broader point of view, the political context of the late 20th and early 21st centuries in Canada seems more than ideal for the development of anti-colonial resistance networks and movements. Following the patriation of the Canadian constitution, the post-1982 constitutional order ushered a new era of social movement development, mainly thanks to the successful use of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by civil society groups as a levee against perceived prejudices (Rocher and Pelletier, 2013). This era of alleged social movement prosperity might in fact be more about the external institutionalization reinforcement of preexisting movements (Ramos and Rodgers 2015, 101); it also came with new developments in counter-movement organization and repression of protest (Wood and Fortier, 2016). Yet, the resurgence and acceleration of grassroots protests and direct action strategies against the ongoing colonial oppression since then is obvious. From the ‘Indian Summer’ of 1990, Ts’Peten, Ipperwash (both in 1995), the Revenu Rez Occupation (1994–1995), the Sun Peaks resistance (1997), Barriere Lake (since 1998), Burnt Church (1999), the creation of the East Coast and West Coast Warrior Societies (2000), Caledonia (2006), the opposition to La Romaine hydro development projects near Uashat Mak Mani-Utenam and subsequent blockades on road 138 in so-called Quebec (2009 to 2012), Elsipogtog (2013), the blockades of Mercier Bridge on the outskirts of Montreal by members of the Kahnawake community and their settler allies in opposition to the dumping of millions of liters of raw sewage into the Saint Laurence waterway (2015), or to the recent shutdowns of the Enbridge 9b pipeline at the border of Quebec and Ontario by small groups of indigenous and settler activists, the last 30 years seem ripe with examples of grassroots contentious politics enforcing a radical opposition to Canadian colonialism. Yet, as mentioned before, these sporadic examples hardly turn into sustained networks and actions (among other things that constitute what we call ‘movements’). It also seems anti-colonialism
struggles with bringing about cultural change within the greater Canadian society. It then remains to be clarified why anti-colonial resistance in Canada experiences difficulty in supporting deep and efficient movements or sustained contentious politics. Thus our first research question addresses the challenges facing Canadian anti-colonialism. An additional concern for the specific nature of Canadian colonialism needs to be taken into account as well. In other words: how does the specific nature of Canadian colonialism affect the development of a Canada-based anti-colonial framework? And how do Canadian anti-colonialism, its actors and its avatars take into account the specificities of Canadian colonialism?

In order to answer those questions, we must first reflect on the specific nature of Canadian colonialism and its relationship to white supremacy and the state. This will be followed by a more precise presentation of how anti-colonialism translates into the reality of Canadian politics. Finally, an examination of anarcho-indigenism through two specific of contentious politics will help illustrate the challenges faced by Canadian anti-colonialism.

I. A narrative of Canadian colonialism.

At first glance, it would seem hard to speak of a present-day colonialism in Canada. Most Canadians would probably agree the mere existence of a Canadian society is linked to colonization; yet, this acknowledgment of colonization is mostly done considering colonization as a history topic, something of the past. The underlying mainstream understanding of colonization seems then to be linked to an idea of non-completeness. How could Canada still be in a situation of ongoing colonization now that it is independent, with definite borders and under the rule of law of a national constitution? After all, the goal of Canadian colonization wasn't it to create a national space *a mari usque ad mare*? This of course elludes the fact that the conquest and exploitation of the Canadian North is still incomplete (the fact that indigenous affairs have been linked with the development of the North since 1966 within the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development is telling) and still requires both the extinguishment of Aboriginal titles and assertion of a Canadian sovereignty superior to any type of indigenous sovereignty.

If addressing Canadian colonization is hardly a piece of cake within Canada, talking of colonialism seems even harder within mainstream society. No doubt part of the issue is the confusion maintained in national narratives between colonization and colonialism. Even though the former might be interpreted as the material reality or realization of the latter (if one assumes the superiority of thought over matter), or contrarily, the latter as the justification of the former, the distinction and relationship between these two sides of the colonial coin is almost always ignored in non-academic public discourses. Another part of the issue is the official denial of colonialism as an integral part of Canadian identity and rule of law. This denial is possible through the erasure of one of the major characteristics of Canadian (and more broadly North-American) colonialism; the fact it is a type of *settler* colonialism, meaning a breed of colonization grounded in the displacement, eradication and
“replacement of indigenous populations with an invasive settler society that, over time, develops a distinctive identity and sovereignty” (Veracini, 2015). Aside from the fact this denial is an integral part of how settler colonialism shows itself as nourishing a dominant group position, it bears strong consequences on the self-reflection of Canadians on their national history, and it participates in concealing the white supremacist roots of Canadian identity.

1. **Ghosts and public secrets: the memory of colonization and invisibility of ongoing dispossession.**

How can Canadianness be defined? Surely, the representations of Canada as a gentle giant are numerous, from the well-known (at least in Canada) satire ‘Canada is really big’ to the definitely more serious (if less accurate) depiction given by a former Canadian Prime Minister at a G20 meeting:

> We should not, you know we're so, we're so, humble isn’t the word, but we're so self-effacing as Canadians that we sometimes forget the assets we do have that other people see. We are a very large country, with a well-established, you know, we have one of the longest-standing democratic regimes, unbroken democratic regimes, in history. (...) *We also have no history of colonialism.*

It is telling that this quote ends with a strange emphasis on the alleged absence of colonialism in Canadian history. After all, Canadianness as the group identity of settler Canadians is based, as any other type of dominant group identity, on the general ignorance of its relative economic and political superiority’s historical causes. Moreover, contrarily to the US where there seems to be a relatively more honest (albeit incomplete and sometimes inaccurate) acknowledgment within the mainstream population of the role violence, genocide and dispossession played in the building of an American identity, Canada seems to be haunted by the ghosts of its colonial past reaching into the present, resulting in Canadianness having a close relationship with what Michael Taussig calls “public secrets”. Exploring how whiteness and indigeneity are articulated in iconic images of Canadian identity, Francis (2011) borrows this concept from Taussig to try and explain how colonial histories and their actualization are both implicitly known and frequently denied in Canada. In other words, public secrets are a “form of knowledge that is generally known but that, for one reason or another, cannot be articulated”. More precisely,

> the secretiveness of the public secret is constituted through a whole set of

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2 Emphasis added; Wherry, A (2009, October 1), “What he was talking about when he talked about colonialism”, *MacLean’s*. Retrieved from [http://www.macleans.ca](http://www.macleans.ca)
“strategic absences” that ensure that most citizens know “what to know” through an active “not seeing”, a process that is often accomplished without the slightest conscious engagement. (Francis 2011, 4)

From this duality of movement between a politically circumscribed knowledge and a reduced range of focal points, the public secret helps shaping Canadianness on a variety of dual oppositions: aboriginal/settler, white/colored, civilized/wild, industrious/lazy, … It goes without saying this structural duality does not accurately represent the materiality of colonization; through the necessity of cheap labour and massive immigration, combined with the constant shifts in group boundaries, the process of colonization tends to require at least as much blending or métissage as exclusion and discrimination. However, this duality is at the core center of colonialism as the most prominent organizing feature of colonized spaces. This is in no way specific to Canadian colonialism, as Fanon and Memmi showed in their most famous works.

This duality is first and foremost ideological in nature. It has served as the backbone of national narratives of Canadianness since the beginning of the Confederation, with a shift in the features being emphasized at different points in time; while the central duality of Canadianness might have been based on clear notions of darwinian Anglo-British supremacy under the leadership of John A. Macdonald, at the other end of the historical spectrum it seems to be revealed by a negation of previous models in favor of a liberal narrative shown in the patron of hyphenated citizenship. Yet, under the disguise of a multicultural liberalism allegedly blind to racial, ethnic or gendered differences within the cradle of a diverse yet unique frame of Canadian citizenship, the duality remains through the hegemony of legal perspectives that tend to be oblivious of nested identities and competing sovereignties. In the end, this constructed erasing of the colonial duality within liberalism only serves as an ultimate example of settler – if not white – privilege and participates in the invisibility of colonial reality to settlers' eyes. This does not mean of course that it escapes the chronic haunting of colonial ghosts; yet, this invisibility remains as an hegemonic framework of Canadianness.

2. A benevolent white supremacy

One of the consequences of the ghostly nature of national memories of colonization in Canada is then the erasement of the foundations of Canada as a white supremacist society. This should be hardly surprising; part of the nature of dominant group positions is to be invisible to those who benefit from them. Moreover, within most western mainstream societies, white supremacy (generally labelled “racism”) tend to be solely interpreted as being explicitly behavioral in nature; racial prejudice is then associated with overt acts of hate, and explicit rejections of other ethnic groups. In this regard, the typical racist is generally portrayed as either a skinhead, a nazi, or a Ku Klux Klan member, while leaving aside the more numerous, daily and more implicit manifestations of racial prejudice.
Moreover, the systemic nature of racial prejudice is also overlooked most of the time, deliberately or not. Canada is no exception; “being often portrayed as an exemplary liberal democratic, peaceful and multicultural society”, it is nonetheless home to systemic racism and deeply entrenched racial prejudices (Denis 2015, 221). What seems also lost on most people is that sustain and systemic racism as well as colonialism “need not be based on overtly negative views about racial minorities in order to be effective” (Bonilla-Silva 2003, 74). In fact, if white supremacy has been foundational to the implementation of European colonialism in North America, it adopted different disguises from the beginnings of European invasion till now. In Canada, three periods in the development of white supremacy can be brought to light.

Starting with first contacts and reaching till 1763 with the British conquest and the Royal Proclamation that followed, the first period in the development of white supremacy in what would later be called Canada can be accurately considered a period of military racism of conquest. In other words, this part of early Canadian history is defined by the precariousness of European presence on Great Turtle Island, which gave rise to a heterogeneous model of group positions. Given the relationships between ethnic groups were shaped by international matters (whether in Europe due to intense warfare between Holland, France and England among others, or within North America where Two-Row Wampum's types of alliances seem to have been generally contracted between European invaders and indigenous nations) and were embedded in the broader intellectual context of European Enlightenment (with all its consideration for Rousseau’s good savage and its relation to humanism as a conception of universal humanity based in the sheer diversity of human cultures), racial prejudices – while already systemic in the form of native slavery in New France for instance – seemed to have remained limited by strategic interests (namely the survival of nascent societies of European descent in North America).

The second period, ranging from the aftermath of the American revolution to the first half of the 20th century, the stabilization of Canadian borders and the gradual renunciation of British imperialism, can be identified by a type of victorian racism. Still influenced in some regards by the humanist stereotypes of the previous period, this second part in the development of a Canadian white supremacy is better defined by a component of social darwinism, and its consequences in terms of assimilation and eugenism. Following the end of military hostilities with the newly-born United States after 1815, the need for indigenous allies gradually disappeared, triggering a growing opposition by London to the continuation of the traditional gifts and presents to Indigenous nations which constituted a significant part of the ritual of alliances between them and the British. Among other major evolutions in the relationship between the British crown and Indigenous nations, treaty negotiations gradually lost their traditional reciprocity; the rapid encroachment on Indigenous territories by Settlers

3 “laws, rules, and norms woven into the social system that result in an unequal distribution of economic, political, and social resources and rewards among various racial groups” (Henry and Tator 2006, 55)
and companies of colonization also increased the pressure upon displaced Indigenous nations. In that context, the reaction of the British intelligentsia seems to have been torn between pessimistic realism and darwinian progressism, which could best be translated by “either wither and die or adapt and embrace the new law of the land”. None better seems to have embodied this ambivalence than the infamous James Campbell Scott. It is telling that even in recent years, Canadians keep wondering how this once well-known poet could both lament the imposed and organized decay of Native culture in his time, and supervise what has been recently deemed a “(cultural) genocide” by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission under the system of residential schools. Even more telling is the fact most Canadians do not realize how common this apparently illogical combination is in the fabric of white supremacy and of Canadian identity.

Nonetheless, this second period is also conspicuous for its evolution from a militarized or strategic racism to a legal and static form of white supremacy, based on the dual politics of exclusion and assimilation, mainly under the Gradual Civilization and Gradual Enfranchisement Acts of 1857 and 1869, later combined under the Indian Act of 1876 (which, while amended over the years, remains in effect). It is interesting to note this evolution corresponds with a more general evolution within Canadian politics towards what Foucault would later coin as “biopolitics” and “biopower”, in the form of control apparatus exerted over a population as a whole, in this case Native peoples. Beginning in the 1850s, under the advice of London-based authorities, the Indian Affairs started implementing policies of assimilation based on medical models of quarantine and intensive care: Native populations were to be secluded in special villages where they would be under the intensive care of missionaries, teachers and Indian agents. To rectify the flaws of this model, another one was devised, quite different but still inspired by medical conceptions: Native people were to be civilized by contagion. And in 1856, commissioners mandated to look into the most efficient policies of civilization advised to use either method, depending on the circumstances (Savard and Proulx 1982, 73). Whatever the reasons, this period of time in Canadian history managed to combine a calculated ethnocide with public narratives that enhanced the disgust the British elites felt regarding the conditions that were imposed to the Natives and their hope they too would share in the benefits of western civilization, preparing the groundwork for the liberal and benevolent racism that would develop in the third and last period.

There are some difficulties in dating precisely the beginning of this third stage in Canadian racism; one could argue it started somewhere between the 1940’s and 1960’s. What is striking is how the official public discourse adopted during the second stage did not change much during the third, nor did its goals. What did change though, were the way the Canadian state intended to reach those. The most striking and probably most famous example of the liberal racism of that period is without doubt Trudeau’s White Paper. Originally intended as a way to “further the advancement of Indigenous people” (which was incidentally also the intent of the Indian Act of 1876) while at the same time suppressing all forms of discriminations towards Native people, the White Paper offered to nullify the Indian
Act and turn Indian-status individuals into regular Canadian citizens, bearers of individual rights, period. Needless to say, this ultimate attempt at assimilation was not well received.

Part of what changed in Canadian colonialism and racial supremacy also had to do with the courts. Starting in 1951, Native people are no longer prohibited from taking legal action. Regional and national associations are also created. Following this, Canadian courts gradually open the way for emancipation within the framework of the liberal state; for the first time in 1973, Indigenous rights are recognized as *sui generis* by the Supreme Court of Canada in the *Calder* decision. In the meantime, the state boards the ship of liberal rights for all: the Canadian Parliament grants Native people the right to vote without the need to renounce their status in 1960; the first Native MP is elected in 1968; the first Native Lieutenant Governor is appointed in 1974; the first Native senator in 1977. This culminates in the patrion of the Canadian constitution in 1982 and the entrenchment of aboriginal rights under section 35 – a mere recognition of a legal fact assessed by the courts before 1982. The next 30 years saw numerous examples of courts' recognition of aboriginal rights, starting with the abolition of the notion of 'emancipation' in 1985. Yet, through the acceleration of treaty processes in the West or through the partial recognition of aboriginal rights by the courts, the main goal of Canadian settler colonialism hardly changed. It is particularly obvious in the fact all the different examples of courts' recognition of aboriginal rights after 1982 reiterated the same continuing principle: Canadian sovereignty is superior to any type of competing sovereignty within the borders of Canada, and any aboriginal right (whether treaty or ancestral in nature) can be extinguished by the state under specific circumstances. What changed – and it is by no mean without importance – is the extent to which this extinguishment can be done without proper consultation, and the speed with which the assimilation of Onkwehonwe authorities and powers can be achieved.

This illustrates the third stage in the development of a white Canadian supremacy, called *charitable racism* by Alfred (2011, 4) or *laissez-faire racism* by Denis (2015). This notion of laissez-faire racism, originally developed to describe the emergence of new types of white racist attitudes against black Americans in the post civil-right era, is taken as the defining ideological structure of contemporary Canadian racism. More specifically,

> it entails probabilistic (not categorical) stereotyping of Indigenous peoples, blaming of Indigenous poverty and social problems on Indigenous people themselves (not historical or structural factors), and "resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate [Canada's] racist social conditions and practices" (…). These views are "rooted in perceptions of threat and the protection of collective group privileges". (Denis 2015, 221)

From this definition, Denis analyzes three micro-social processes in the form of localized collective behaviors, that reinforce the feeling of collective superiority white settlers tend to feel and support, even in the case of frequent contacts with Onkwehonwe
individuals and groups: subtyping (“the exception that proves the rule”), itself based on an ideology-based homophily (“the tendency to befriend others with similar (racial) ideologies, regardless of their “race”’), embedded in a widespread if not national political avoidance norm (“public discussions of racism and colonization are taboo”). These three micro-social processes are themselves deemed natural, or non-contentious by their participants because they are embedded in the ideological and institutional structure of Canadian society, itself linked to the centrality of the Canadian state in the shaping and sustainability of an allegedly just, compassionate and contentious civil society.

3. **The centrality of the state.**

As in the case of other North-American histories of European settlement, the colonization of Canada revealed itself as both the foundation and endgame of a distinct type of nation-building and consolidation of static infrastructures. The debates that took place during much of the 19th century regarding the shape the Dominion of Canada should take are exemplary in that matter; so is the building of infrastructure such as the Canadian Pacific railway under the leadership of John A. Macdonald. Moreover, Morantz identifies Canadian colonialism as being mostly bureaucratic in nature (Morantz, 2002). Taking the relationships between the Crees and and the state in Quebec as an example, he shows that the progressive loss of control suffered by First Nations in Canada resulted from the phased instauration of a daily control of indigenous lives by a paternalist and alien state bureaucracy. It illustrates what Manuel and Polsons mean when they write “the colonial system is always a way of gaining control over another people for the sake of what the colonial power has determined to be 'the common good'” (Alfred and Corntassel 2011, 141). This loss of control did not come simply from engineered starvation as in the case of the colonization of the Plains (Daschuk, 2013); it also came from public services such as health services, schools, welfare, and so on.

In the same manner, Ladner (2010) develops the idea that Canadian colonialism reveals itself in the shape of 'political genocide':

It sought to dismantle Indigenous structures of governance (including pre-colonial systems of multilevel governance) and Indigenous sovereignty, substituting its own system of puppet government. Although some communities retained their 'traditional' governments (albeit in transformed and disempowered forms), the colonial government's act of regime replacement resulted in the band councils that operate almost universally today in First Nations or Indian reserves in Canada and in many Inuit communities (where self-government agreements have not been negotiated). Where self-government agreements have been negotiated, alternative structures of governance have been established, although except for Nunavut these have been modeled on the band council system. (Ladner 2010, 69)
This imposed relationship under the Indian Act and the later incorporation of indigenous rights in the Canadian constitution constitutes both an opportunity and an obstacle for anticolonial movements. While Canadian federalism is usually viewed as a formidable hindrance in furthering decolonization, the urgency of soothing and treating social ailments rooted in colonization makes “engaging with multiple level of governance (...) necessary to achieve the dismantling of the colonial state” (Ladner 2010, 72).

Adding an intentional feature in the creation of a maintained dependency to material and ideological state infrastructures, the notion of constitutional colonialism found in Adams (Adams, 1995) echoes both Morantz’s bureaucratic colonialism and Ladner’s analysis of the contradictory relationship with the state in which Indigenous movements (particularly women movements) are stuck. Yet, this shaping of a dependency to state authorities by processes embedded in bureaucratic apparatus is not specific to Native movements, even though it might appear as particularly unfortunate if not utterly grim in their instance; the Canadian state has also played a leading role in shaping and sustaining Canadian social movements in general. Starting in the 1960s, it did so by funding and cooperating with social movements, and after 1982 by promoting the use of courts by civil society organizations and social movements to challenge structural prejudices, even when those prejudices were thought or found to be linked to state policies. From the standpoint of liberal settler organizations, this might appear as a sign that contrary to other countries, close ties between mainstream political institutions and social movements in Canada did not end up in any form of co-optation. Yet, considering that “from the very outset, Canadian movements and social justice organizations have tended to rely on the state for their very existence” (Ramos and Rodgers 2015, 8), and given the extent to which this public funding has affected the range of action of many movements pertaining to our definition of anti-colonialism⁴, this sort of liberal optimism can hardly stand the test of reality. On the contrary, the main consequence of this public shaping of social movements and the blurring of the separation between mainstream and increasingly institutionalized contentious politics has been the further entrenchment of indigenous rights and contention within the state apparatus, drastically reducing the possibilities for decolonization – understood as a reinforcement of indigenous (external) self-determination and sovereignties – into what Alfred calls “politics of distraction” (Alfred and Corntassel 2011, 140).

Lastly, the centrality of the state in Canada took another shape with the emergence of

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a dual model of protest policing in most western countries during the 1990s (della Porta, Fillieule and Reiter, 1998). This model, based on a “soft hat” strategy towards those who negotiate and communicate clearly with police and a “hard hat” or “riot control” strategy towards those who refuse to do so and are therefore seen as “unpredictable” and threatening by state authorities, while not always automatic and dependent on local conditions, normalized militarized responses towards non-institutionalized contentious movements in Canada (Wood, 2015). As exemplified by numerous accounts of militarized police repression towards movements pertaining to our anti-colonial framework since the 1980s, the increased militarization of official responses to challenges to Canadian authority illustrates the centrality of the state in the assertion of a colonial order and therefore the necessity for anti-colonial action to articulate its responses in this regard.

II. What is anticolonialism?

As mentioned in the introduction, our definition of anti-colonialism does not intend to deny any validity to other analyses of similar processes under such terms as 'decoloniality' or 'post-colonialism'. Rather, it is meant as a specific focus on how movements and ideologies supporting them organize in the world of daily affairs in order to counter the continuation of processes of colonization.

This being said, anti-colonialism in Canada appears as being shaped by a commitment to decolonization, to which must be added a component of competition between grassroots and institutionalized levels of organizing and action.

1. The main features of contemporary Canadian anti-colonialism

Three things must be said of contemporary Canadian anti-colonialism. The first, and most logical, is the central place it gives to decolonization. The second is related to how anti-colonialism can be classified as a movement. And the last is what this classification bears in terms of consequences regarding the internal organization of the movement.

First, anti-colonialism is defined by its focus on decolonization. As mentioned by Ladner, decolonization is the subject of longstanding debates within communities, organizations and academic circles (Ladner 2010, 73). Decolonization can be understood in a variety of ways depending on the agent; in regards to Settlers for instance, this can mean admitting “that Onkwehonwe have rights that are collective and inherent to their indigeneity and that are autonomous from the Settler society – rights to land, to culture, and to community” (Alfred 2011, 4). From an Indigenous perspective, it refers to the necessity of the “creation of a new paradigm and a transformation of how Indigenous peoples (will) interact with the Canadian state.” (Ladner 2010, 80). It can also be considered in a two-fold manner, as internal (within nations) and external (within Canada) (Ladner 2010, 68) to which
some might even add a psychological if not individualistic component\(^5\). In any case, the main framework of decolonization refers to a collective process of Indigenous empowerment, through transformed individual and collective relationships between Settler and Indigenous communities, which entails a particular focus on Indigenous nationhood and a nation-to-nation relationship with the state. It thus opposes the politics of aboriginalism as the “prettied-up face of neo-colonialism”, based on the subsumption of Indigenous governments and lands within the colonial state through active cooperation with official authorities and processes, among which non-disruptive resolution seems to have become the dominant paradigm, whether through courts or state-driven public inquiries (Alfred 2011, 7).

The other two central features of anti-colonialism mentioned previously ensue from this commitment to decolonization. As a movement, anti-colonialism can best be described as being value-oriented and based on the “expression of specific values and the following of a way of life”, contrarily to more success-oriented movements based on the “achievement of specific claims” (Ramos and Rodgers 2015, 257). This does not mean anti-colonial movements never devise specific claims. On the contrary, whether through retribution, land retrocession or demands that development projects be stopped, anti-colonialism is often embodied in specific claims. Yet, considering its goals address the very fabric of North-American Settler and Indigenous societies and identities, it can hardly be considered mostly instrumental in nature. What is at stake here is a notion of activist timeline; considering the depth of Settler societies and ideologies' rootedness in North-America, it seems hardly possible the goals of anti-colonialism be overcome within our lifetime (if they can ever be completed). Thus to achieve its goals, anti-colonialism also 'seek to transform cultural values, beliefs, and collective identities' (Ramos and Rodgers 2015, 255).

In other words, anti-colonialism constitutes a master frame committed to the emergence of a collective identity. As mentioned in the introduction, anti-colonialism seems to be experiencing difficulties in propagating its ideological structures; its own framework is also still the subject of internal disputes. Taking those issues into account is crucial considering they are generally identified as being the result of colonialism, meaning they are part in and of themselves of the anti-colonial collective identity. Aside from being a master frame, anti-colonialism also constitutes a collective action frame; it links together different movements' concerns, being defined in part by the confluence of Indigenous, environmental and global justice movements.

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\(^5\) As in Alfred and Corntassel 2011, p.143: “Decolonization and regeneration are not, at root, collective and institutional processes. They are shifts in thinking and action that emanate from recommitments and reorientations at the level of the self that, over time and through proper organization, manifest as broad social and political movements to challenge state agendas and authorities. To a large extent, institutional approaches to making meaningful change in the lives of Indigenous people have not led to what we understand as decolonization and regeneration; rather they have further embedded Indigenous people in the colonial institutions they set out to challenge.”
Lastly, what ensues from the anti-colonial opposition to aboriginalism is a commitment to grassroots organizing and actions. Considering the centrality of the state in the shaping, sustainability and institutionalizing of both Canadian civil society organizations and colonialism, national movements and organizations that depend mostly on the state for their core-funding (such as the Assembly of First Nations) cannot be regarded as pertaining to an anti-colonial framework. This grassroots approach is probably what constitutes the main reason for the confluence of Indigenous, environmental and global justice movements within anti-colonialism in that it allows a direct contention with capitalism. The continuation of Canadian colonization being based in the control of the land (through capitalist development of territories and their entrenchment under liberal property rights), the coalition of those three strands of political activism is a defining feature of anti-colonial organization.

2. The three-course meal of anti-colonialism

Apart from a commitment to grassroots organizing, what makes some Indigenous, environmental, and global justice movements come together around an anti-colonial masterframe is a common concern for universality. This has to do with specific cultural or ideological traditions in each of the three sectors of anti-colonialism, but it also has to do with strategic positioning. The universality of global justice movements' claims is self-explanatory; it consists primarily in challenging (what is interpreted as) neo-liberal imperialism by a “globalization from below” (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter, 2006). As for environmentalist movements, whether grassroots or highly institutionalized, they have long been concerned with the preservation of ecosystems as part of the 'global commons', understood first as “those parts of the earth's surface beyond national jurisdictions”⁶, but also increasingly encompassing all ecosystems as localized commons. Indigenous movements also do their best to frame their interests in inclusive, communal and universal terms. In the same way as for global justice and environmental movements, this might have to do with aspects of their political culture, even though this might seem hard to generalize in the case of Native movements given the vast diversity of Indigenous cultures in North America. Caution is called for when judging of cultural contents in the context of ongoing colonization; it is almost always too easy to assign essentialist notions of goodness to groups mainstream cultural schemes show as being on the verge of extinction. Given the inclination of Westerners to assign ethnocentrists concepts of goodness (based on a notion of Enlightenment-inspired universality) under the guise of “good savage” stereotypes to cultures they otherwise deem uncivilized, special care must be taken not to replicate such seemingly down-to-earth common sense. No matter the probable cultural rootedness of universal concerns, Indigenous movements in North America tend to frame their interests in more inclusive, communal terms in part for strategic aims (Denis 2012, 462). One of the main

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reasons for this strategic use of universal terms obviously has to do with the context of ongoing liberal colonization, where openly adversarial approaches may be seen as counter-productive given the unfavorable balance of power for Native movements, particularly at the local level.

In general, the coming together of these three strands of activism seems to happen for strategic reasons. Those strategic reasons can be both ideological or very instrumental in nature. For instance, if some global justice and environmental movements feel the need to seek the collaboration of Indigenous groups, they might do so for reasons linked to white guilt, for ethical concerns regarding the necessity to include the most marginalized sections of Canadian society, or due to the realisation that the publicity of Indigenous consent (or lack of) is a more efficient tool for stopping certain development projects than regular direct action. On the other hand, some Indigenous movements try to look for settler allies in order to strengthen local resistance to projects that first target (but are not limited to) their territories, to get access to more resources (funds, popular education, etc.), or following the realization it might be hard to attain national if not global change without fostering alliances with outsider and larger groups.

Another strategic concern should be mentioned regarding counter-movement insurgency. Under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper, the repression of environmental, leftist and indigenous movements was strengthened, in law and practice. The infamous Bill C-51, comprising 'anti-terror' legislation, was passed in June 2015, effectively providing extended surveillance powers to Canadian intelligence organizations, while broadening the definition of 'terrorism' to the extent that any activity targeting 'critical infrastructures' might be part of that definition. Considering the simultaneous expansion of “surveillance of public activities to include all known demonstrations across the country” and the militarization of counter insurgency, these recent trends tend to ease activists’ (pre-emptive or not) targeting by police forces, even in the absence of definite criminal acts, effectively tying 'dissent' to 'threat'. Yet, as seen recently with numerous (successful) attempts at disturbing pipeline infrastructures, this government framing of a “growing, highly organized and well financed, anti-Canadian petroleum movement that consists of peaceful activists, militant and violent extremists who are opposed to society’s reliance on fossil fuels” (Wood and Fortier 2016, 15) seems to have had the effect of strengthening such anti-colonial alliances instead of weakening them.

3. The challenges faced by anti-colonialism

Yet, for all those aspects tying together what we call a Canadian anti-colonialism, this

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kind of value-oriented movement faces strong challenges. In reality, anti-colonialism seems to experience difficulties in spreading its message within Canada. Given its value-oriented nature, this seems problematic. And even when there seems to be a genuine interest for anti-colonialism in activist circles, there seems to be some sort of reluctance to embrace this frame entirely. Considering what was analyzed above, three hypotheses as to why these difficulties appear can be formulated. First, these challenges take root in a poorly consolidated frame. This hypothesis can itself be divided in two; the lack of frame consolidation might be due to a colonial competition between collective group positions within the anti-colonial framework. For instance, the relative lack of understanding and/or acknowledgment of racial/privilege issues within (generally white) settler leftist movements tend to trigger political tensions between indigenous and non-indigenous activists. This sometimes turns into what could be coined selective empowerment whereby some ‘subaltern’ activists might be favored by their white/settler counterparts based on their gender, ethnicity, militancy, or rather based on how these elements relate to pre-conceived stereotypes within white/settler environments. In other words, the first issue with the anti-colonial frame’s poor consolidation might arise due to the transfer of colonial competition within anti-colonialism.

The second element arising from a poorly consolidated frame might have to do with what Staggenborg mentions when she writes “movement activists have generally agreed on a diagnostic frame (emphasis added) that focuses on the shortcomings of neo-liberalism, but they have more difficulty agreeing on a prognostic frame that would direct challenges to neo-liberalism and present alternatives” (Staggenborg 2011, 176). This seems to be particularly true in the case of anti-colonialism. This again should be hardly surprising; given the cultural and political diversity of actors within anti-colonialism, issues such as the legitimate use of violence (and its consequences on marginalized or racialized communities) against state repression tend to be divisive. And even though a clear line of diversity of tactics seems to have emerged over the years, this particular issue seems far from being resolved.

Second, the challenges faced by anti-colonialism might have to do with movement structure. It echoes the first point in that it calls back to issues of strategy. Given the relative importance of state-backed movements in Canada, competition arises between grassroots and institutionalized organizations. This aspect is not necessarily consistent across the anti-colonial spectrum. For instance, the competition between grassroots and state-backed environmental organizations might not generally be in favor of the latter (in this particular example, it remains to be clarified where to draw the line between institutionalized, grassroots and state-backed organizations; for instance, if Greenpeace is not supported by state funds, it is institutionalized to some extent). However, this changes radically if we look at Indigenous organizations. While some grassroots endeavours are met with apparent success (like the Unist’ot’en camp), national state-funded organizations such as the Assembly of First Nations are still occupy and central place of authority and power regarding Native sovereignty issues. This has to do in part with the increased militarization of grassroots movement repression by the state. Yet, this last point may in fact be a source of solidarity
instead of an actual difficulty if we follow Wood when she mentions that “within a context of escalating mobilization, the dual model and its militarization is not dividing and conquering different types of protesters but rather building solidarity between previously cooperative and uncooperative protesters, increasing the militancy of the movement” (Ramos and Rodgers 2015, 150). This, however, necessitates an “escalating context of mobilization” which, if allegedly underway, seems to be only in its beginning.

In another way, it also harkens back to what was previously said regarding the prognostic frame. For instance, internal division occurs regarding the role some individuals might play in local struggles, as in the case of local chiefs who happen to be part of band councils. Given the Indian Act origin of the band council system, there is no denying the concern is legitimate; yet, those individuals are sometimes the only ones benefiting from any kind of organizing power within extremely marginalized communities, turning this issue into a debate between political means and ends.

Finally, the third type of challenge faced by anti-colonialism seems to arise from the problematic nature of alliances between Native and Settler individuals or organizations. This refers to what was mentioned briefly as an example of the first hypothesis, namely the issue of privilege. Given the extent of white supremacy in Canada and how it works through ghosts and public secrets, most (white) settlers tend to be ignorant of indigenous struggles, even while being activists themselves and sharing a genuine interest in anti-colonial principles. This, in turn, might be linked to features of Canadian social movements: a lot of Indigenous struggles have been happening through the judicial system, making them somewhat arcane to activists without a law background or who are not directly involved in those struggles; the territorial segregation of settler and native communities tend to add a level of difficulty to group contacts that might alleviate part of the easiness with which settlers explain their relative ignorance, “because (they) don't know how to learn all that stuff”. And even then, sustained group contacts do not necessarily mean an increase in settlers' understanding of native issues, cultures or political claims (Denis, 2012; Denis, 2015; Krause and Ramos, 2015).

All in all, these three different hypotheses tend to speak to one another and their distinction is sometimes blurred in reality. Assessing them in the case of anarcho-indigenism might help to clarify some of their features.

III. Anarcho-indigenism: a case study

Before diving into specific example, some things need to be said regarding the object that is anarcho-indigenism, namely its conceptual origins, its content and how it translates into reality.

1. Genealogy of a concept.
Anarcho-indigenism (or anarcha-indigenism when it is coupled with a concern for intersectional feminism) might be defined as a “contextual anarchism”, “a coming together of anarchist and Indigenous theory and practice... In this way, [it] foregrounds a critique of the intersections, overlaps and mutual dependencies that exist between the state, capitalism, colonialism, white supremacy and patriarchy... Its foremost intervention though is the bringing of a decolonizing analysis to anarchism and a push towards locally and contextually rooted strategies for decolonization” (Lewis 2015, 176). It finds its main conceptual roots in Alfred’s book *Wasasé* (Alfred, 2005), although traces of it might be found earlier in contributions by Churchill or anarchist writer Aragorn. Alfred envisions anarcho-indigenism as a warrior ethic transferred into politics, a mix between an indigenous *ethos* and an anarchist *praxis* that would find an incarnation in

> a rejection of alliances with legalized systems of oppression, non-participation in the institutions that structure the colonial relationship and a belief in bringing about change through direct action, physical resistance, and confrontations with state power. (Alfred 2005, 46)

This concept, largely abandoned by its primary author, was then refined by a number of Settler and Indigenous activists and academics among which Day (2008), Lasky (2011), Smith (2005), Simpson (2011), Coulthard (2014) or Lewis (2015) are the most noticeable. Among the most recent contributions, two can be shown in a sort of dialectic: Coulthard’s addition of a place-based approach linked with a rejection of the lure of court-based action (particularly in the shape of the Modern Treaty Process) and Lewis’ assumption of anarcho/a-indigenism as “a ‘third space’, a ‘n-dimensional’ space of meeting where theoretical perspectives can come to engage with one another” (Lewis 2012, ii). These two approaches seem complementary given their different focal points; while Coulthard does not shy away from a theoretical if not philosophical analysis of Canadian colonialism and its consequences, his conclusions appear more tangible or practical than Lewis’ prescriptions, even though the latter constitute without doubt a substantial contribution to the discussions on post-colonial anarchism. Those two sides of the same concept are important because they relate to the complexities of our object, namely something a lot of activists would want to see materialize in a sustained manner, yet that seems dependable on specific and limited situations. In other words, anarcho/a-indigenism both refers to an ideal that remains to be completely materialized in action, and a commitment to a specific type of anti-colonialism that brings together Indigenous and anarchist perspectives.

### 2. Solidarities in action

Probably the best way to talk about anarcho/a-indigenism is to illustrate it. Two kinds of examples come to mind; first, occurrences when the 'third space' of anarcho/a-indigenism was (to be) created/happened in the midst of direct action or mobilizations (i.e. protests); second, how anarcho/a-indigenism might (or might not) translate into the routine work of everyday activism (through the organization of conferences, popular education, etc.). Two instances in which anarcho/a-indigenism was taken as an explicit guideline in organizing and protest will be briefly analyzed. In the following examples, I draw from academic works (Lagalisse, 2011) as well as from my personal experience as an activist within anti-colonial, anarchist and student movements in Quebec. The first example is the organization of events surrounding Printemps 2015 in Quebec, particularly the set-up of the Appel de l’Est camp in the Kamouraska region in August 2015; for my second example, I rely on Lagalisse's participatory research on a speaking tour of two indigenous activists from Oaxaca, organized by an anarchist collective in Quebec in October 2006. These two examples have a dual use: first, as mentioned before, they are meant to illustrate anarcho/a-indigenism in action; second, and most importantly, they serve to relate anarcho/a-indigenism to the broader context of anti-colonialism, and to illustrate the above-mentioned difficulties that arise from this framework.

In 2012, Quebec was paralysed by the most important student strike of its history. It was exceptional not only in the number of students who participated, but also in the way the state repressed the movement, both in court and in the street. It rapidly became a benchmark against which subsequent student movements were measured. The post-movement analysis coming from academic and activist circles was also impressive, ranging from laudatory considerations regarding the politisation of Quebec youth to more critical assessments of the shortcomings of the movement. Within the radical student activist milieu, two main observations were made (among others): it was indeed possible to horizontally organize a massive social movement and to by-pass traditional unions and organizations in doing so; efforts had to be made to include more diverse perspectives, particularly with regard to the ongoing colonization of so-called Quebec. These considerations were later taken into account in the grassroots organization of what was to be known as Printemps 2015 (Spring 2015). After being brought to power by the 2012 strike, the Parti Québécois (centre-left, nationalist) minority government lost the 2014 elections, giving way to a majority government led by the Parti Liberal (conservative, previously led by Jean Charest while in power up until the 2012 strike), ushering a new era of austerity-led politics. With the planned re-negotiation of a significant part of Quebec public sector’s collective agreements in the following year, mobilization actors within the student movements assumed 2015 would become another occasion for widespread social unrest and started organizing accordingly.

10 This realization came in the later part of the 2012 movement, in the context of the Salon du Plan Nord in Montreal; a violent demonstration happened during that event which goal was to promote the development of the North of Quebec (home of most First Nation communities within the province) through resource extraction, effectively linking anti-colonial concerns to student claims in the mind of many activists.
Their attempts at leading student strikes during the spring of 2015 in order to trigger a wider social movement did not fare well, but the goal of uniting student concerns with broader social issues nonetheless survived and gave rise to the setting-up of l’Appel de l’Est (The Call of the East). This budding organization – derived from student and anarchist grassroots organizations – issued a call in the spring of 2015 in hope of linking the struggle against austerity with local struggles against pipelines, fracking and gas development in the eastern region of Gaspésie in Quebec (it is notably interesting to stress that the founding document of l’Appel de l’Est started with a call to “environmentalists, indigenous communities, allies, friends, comrades”). Apart from organizing conference tours, forums, or movie screenings, a significant part of the organizing work went into setting up a week-and-a-half-camp against hydrocarbons in the Kamouraska region to bring together activists from different backgrounds, from July 31 to August 9, 2015. While the organizing committee did include explicit references to anti-colonialism in their framework for action\(^{11}\), things got tense at the beginning of the camp when Indigenous activists and some of their allies requested alcohol be banned from the camp for safety reasons and as acknowledgment of the issues many marginalized Indigenous communities and individuals face with regard to alcohol abuse (it was planned this ban be lifted during the week-ends as music shows were happening). Although this was included in a document called “Dispositions to make the camp as safe and inclusive as possible” prior to the camp in hope it would be adopted as a code of conduct by camp attendees, this issue led to intense debates, refusal from the vast majority of non-indigenous participants, and resulted in prominent Indigenous activists' decision not to attend the camp.

The second experience from which I draw is detailed in Lagalisse's article “Marginalizing Magdalena” (2011). In her work, she details a tour of Quebec and Ontario by Juan and Magdalena, two indigenous activists involved in the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO), organized by several anarchist collectives in Montreal in October 2006. Both activists had different ways of narrating their own experiences of the struggle in Mexico:

Juan spoke of union movements, the formation of the APPO, and the state repression of his people. He spoke in the third person, assuming the voice of a generalized, objective “other”. Magdalena spoke in the first person, about specific people who were tortured and what they told afterward. She told stories about her experience as a community health worker and described how government representatives tried to persuade her to promote sterilization among indigenous women across the region. Magdalena also spoke of the need to maintain harmonious ways of life

\(^{11}\) Among other examples, l’Appel de l’Est founding document mentions “a convergence (…) between groups of ecologists, anti-colonialists and students”, “unceded indigenous territories”, development “undertaken in complete disrespect of indigenous peoples' ways of life and communities”, and a call to “do away with oil addiction and abolish the colonialist mindset”. Retrieved from http://appeldelest.org/en/the-callout/
among the communities and the need to respect all of Creation, land, water, and peoples. She spoke alternately of God and the Creator, synthesizing moral ecology and popular Catholicism. The anarchist translators largely omitted these references and summed up her narratives rather than offering the word-for-word translation they granted Juan’s discourse. (Lagalisse 2001, 660)

Lagalisse goes on to mention how this initial unbalance in the reception of the two speakers gradually increased to almost completely elicit Magdalena’s narrative at the end of the tour. When Lagalisse approached the men who were to lead Juan and Magdalena during the last part of the tour to discuss the latter obvious marginalization from the anarchist organizers’ concerns, she was told that “it was important to keep (her) “white feminism” to (her)sel(f)” (even though it appears this comment was made without having asked Magdalena how she felt about the whole situation) and that “Juan (had) more of an analysis, (was) more articulate, educated, and he (had) more experience in politics and the union movements” (Lagalisse 2011, 661).

3. **Analysis: anarchy, misogyny and racial prejudice.**

These two examples show two fault lines that serve to illustrate at least two of our above mentioned hypotheses: the use or prohibition of alcohol in the context of a protest camp as an example of a poorly consolidated frame, and the issues of gender and secularism as examples of selective empowerment and privilege.

The first example is embedded in a general culture of youth militancy and bounding. The main reason most settler activists refused to consider a ban on alcohol was they interpreted it as an illegitimate limit on their freedom, particularly within the limits of the camp where alcohol was seen by them as an easy mean of fostering new friendships thanks to the relative disinhibition caused by it. The criticism of such an approach as being essentially simplistic was shared by both feminist and anti-colonial activists or groups, particularly considering a history of drug or alcohol-induced sexual harassment and aggressions within the Montreal anarchist milieu in the previous years. Yet, what came out of many discussions with settler activists who attended the camp is a general ignorance of the history of colonial use of alcohol as means of weakening Indigenous resistance, of hardships experienced by many marginalized communities due to state-sponsored alcohol (ab)use, and of grassroots challenges to such hardships through sobriety education.

All in all, this serves to illustrate the issue of privilege and selective empowerment: through collective ignorance and the possibility to impose a specific culture of militancy while legitimizing it with ethnocentric political principles (along individualistic notions of

12 This criticism seems to have had some positive consequences less than a year after, with many Montreal activists adopting sobriety oriented attitudes or policies in their common spaces.
freedom), the issue of alcohol effectively prohibited the strengthening of anti-colonial solidarities and thus undermined anti-colonial possibilities for concerted action.

Regarding the example of Magdalena's marginalizing, I share Lagalisse's conclusions she details in her work. By demonstrating how the criticisms of Magdalena's presentations as being less legitimate or less interesting are embedded in a religion/secular dichotomy, which “is in turn sustained by a number of other shifting dichotomies... [that] extend into colonial logic, in which “the construction of a 'sexual space' paralleled the construction of a space to be colonized” (Lagalisse 2011, 671), as well as a reification of cultural identity by anarchist activists, Lagalisse shows another illustration of privilege based in ethnocentric militancy, with consequences in terms of (selective) empowerment.

Other elements do not appear in those specific examples yet are part of the daily challenges I experience when analyzing anti-colonial possibilities in Canada. The most important of those examples is probably the complicated relationship to the state. This is particularly prescient considering the centrality of the state in both Canadian colonialism and in anarchist frameworks for action. A complementary analysis of this particular element will have to be the topic of an additional research project.

Concluding words

Through this expose on white supremacy, colonialism and flawed attempts at anarcho/a-indigenist organizing, I tried to give a broad picture of the present-day Canadian colonial situation and its anti-colonial response. Two things need to be addressed as a matter of conclusion. I want to clarify that even though I presented a critical assessment of anarcho/a-indigenism, this does not equate a rejection of it as a legitimate and/or useful illustration of anti-colonialism. On the contrary, I side with Lagalisse when she writes

(a)narchoa-indigenism may carry within it the potential for a critically engaged conversation across difference but only if the universalisms of anarchism and indigenism are constantly reformulated through dialogue and engaged with a third universalism, feminism, which itself must constantly be reformulated. (Lagalisse 2011, 674)

In other words, I tried to use the two above mentioned examples as illustrations of the incompleteness of anti-colonial endeavors in Canada, while acknowledging the current efforts made by activists and academics to improve such attempts. Moreover, I realize a stronger focus on feminist issues should accompany the analysis I made in the course of this work. This is obviously easier said than done; being a white male, grasping and legitimately speaking of issues against which I hold a position of privilege is in itself a challenge. And while I may be able to un- or re-balance such privilege by focusing on settlers'
inconsistencies within anti-colonialism, I'm still not certain how to add a consistent layer of feminist analysis to my narrative (suggestions are welcome).

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